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‘Abortion Games’: The Negotiation of
Termination Decisions in Post-1967 Britain
JANE O’NEILL
University of Edinburgh
The 1967 Abortion Act placed the responsibility for determiningthe appropriate grounds for a termination with two medicalpractitioners. This assessment, to be made ‘in good faith’, hinged
on the doctor’s interpretation of the wording of the Act and how
widely they deﬁned the potential ‘risks’ of continued pregnancy.1 This
responsibility could be troubling for doctors, who were being asked to
use their medical expertise to determine what many considered to be a
non-medical matter. Doctors varied, both between and within localities,
not only in their interpretation of the terms of the Act but also in their
ethical and personal attitudes to abortion and to women who might
ﬁnd themselves in this situation. While some doctors adopted a more
liberal policy, based on the woman’s wishes, others felt a ﬁrm conviction
to interrogate the patient’s reasons and perhaps persuade her to take a
different course of action. This article focuses on the relationship between
doctors and women seeking abortions following the passage of this Act,
which placed doctors in a position of having to determine which cases
were appropriate and deserving, creating a situation which some have
argued facilitated performance and ‘game playing’.2
The individuals involved in these decision-making processes may have
had differing perspectives or objectives, and while these were sometimes
overt it was often mooted by both doctors and reproductive rights
campaigners that elements of concealed strategizing or performance
might be present in these negotiations. Instead of adopting outright
persuasion, doctors could distance themselves from the decision-making
process; for instance, general practitioners could refer their patient
without including a recommendation either way, or make the referral
to a gynaecologist who was known to be either particularly liberal
This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council as part of the project ‘The
Abortion Act (1967): a Biography’ [grant number AH/N00213X/1].
1 Abortion Act, 1967.
2 I. M. Ingram, ‘Abortion Games: an inquiry into the working of the Act’, The Lancet, 298/7731,
30 Oct. 1971, pp. 969–70; British Pregnancy Advisory Survey [hereafter BPAS], The Abortion Hurdle
Race: The Role of the Doctor as a Taker of Abortion Decisions (London, 1975).
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2 ‘ABORTION GAMES’
or particularly stringent, making the decision a somewhat foregone
conclusion. They could delay appointments, or approve the procedure
only if sterilization was also agreed to, in order to put the woman off or
encourage her to look elsewhere.3 Women seeking terminations, on the
other hand, were often aware that certain circumstances or scenarios were
more likely to gain sympathy than others, and might tailor their stated
reasons for seeking termination accordingly. A mother struggling with
multiple children already, or a ‘nice girl’ in unfortunate circumstances
who exhibited remorse, were often looked upon with more understanding
than someone who had apparently failed to demonstrate responsibility by
using contraception effectively, and particularly someone who required
more than one termination.4 This knowledge might encourage the
presentation of particular narratives, and in turn cause doctors to be wary
of being told something that ﬁtted too closely to what they expected or
needed to hear.
Contemporary studies of abortion practice showed clearly that this
process of negotiation and assessment varied signiﬁcantly, contributing to
divergent abortion ﬁgures and experiences of women seeking terminations
both within and between regions across Britain. The way the medical
interview functioned in practice will be explored through an analysis
of medical and sociological studies of abortion practice in the ﬁrst
two decades the Act was in operation, and through the testimonies
of healthcare professionals involved in decision-making and of women
seeking terminations. Despite sustained and increasing criticism, and
numerous attempts to change the law over the past ﬁve decades, the need
for two doctors to certify appropriate grounds has remained in place for
ﬁfty years. Though the legal situation has not changed, medical and lay
perceptions of the purpose and function of the medical interview have
developed considerably across this time, and the degree to which doctor–
patient interactions and the making of termination decisions has changed
in practice as a result will be considered.
Under the terms of the Act, in order to certify grounds for termination
two medical practitioners have to agree in good faith that continuing
the pregnancy would involve greater risk of ‘injury to the physical or
mental health of the pregnant women or any existing children of her
family’, or that there is ‘substantial risk’ of serious foetal anomaly. In
making this judgement they can take into account ‘the pregnant woman’s
actual or reasonably foreseeable environment’.5 In most cases the two
doctors would be the patient’s general practitioner and the consultant
gynaecologist who would undertake the termination, but women might
also be referred to and assessed by other hospital doctors, psychiatrists,
family planning doctors, medical social workers, and pregnancy advisory
service doctors and counsellors, in an extended ‘interviewing process’.
3 See the works cited in n. 2.
4 Sally Macintyre, Single and Pregnant (London, 1977).
5 Abortion Act.
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The Act was commended by many doctors at the time it was passed for
being ‘permissive’ and yet ‘in no way obligatory’, due to its provision of a
conscientious objection clause which ensured that no doctors would be
forced to undertake the operation, except to save a pregnant woman’s
life.6 While the terms of the Act were ‘deliberately vague’, leaving
considerable scope for interpretation and discretion, it stopped well short
of abortion ‘on demand’ in placing the responsibility for the decision
deﬁnitively with the medical profession and not the pregnant woman.7
The Act was passed primarily for public health reasons, to halt criminal
abortions and provide doctors with legal protection from prosecution
under certain circumstances, and control the provision of abortion
by bringing women ‘out of the backstreets and into contact with their
GPs’.8 In fact, one aim or desired consequence of the Act was to
reduce numbers of terminations through promoting and legitimating
contact between women experiencing crisis pregnancy and a reasoned
and reassuring doctor. During the debates on his Bill, David Steel
asserted that ‘in many cases’ the effect of its introduction would be fewer
abortions, since being able freely to consult the family doctor could
provide reassurance and ‘guidance’ to a patient who would otherwise seek
a backstreet abortion, helping and encouraging her to continue with the
pregnancy instead.9
In the early years of the Act, some compared the decision to place
the responsibility with two doctors favourably with systems operating
in other countries, such as the Scandinavian ‘tribunal procedure’ which
reportedly resulted in signiﬁcant delays and discouraged women from
seeking legal abortion.10 Another beneﬁt noted by some was that being
granted a termination by two doctors might validate women’s own
decisions, positioning their reasons as ‘socially acceptable’ and therefore
lessening ‘the guilt and self-recrimination that a few women feel’.11
Writing in 1971, consultant psychiatrist Hordern felt that ‘many women
ﬁnd comfort in realising that it is a considered decision, taken by
two independent medical practitioners in light of the total situation,
and that it is not being performed merely because they (the patients)
are worried or are evading their responsibilities’.12 Such a construction
6 S. J. Macintyre, ‘The medical profession and the 1967 Abortion Act in Britain’, Social Science and
Medicine, 7/2 (1973), pp. 121–34, at p. 129.
7 Sally Sheldon, Beyond Control:Medical Power and Abortion Law (London, 1997), p. 59; Macintyre,
‘The medical profession’, p. 131.
8 F. Amery, ‘Solving the “woman problem” in British abortion politics: a contextualised account’,
British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 17/4 (2015), pp. 551–67; Sheldon,Beyond Control,
pp. 17, 26.
9 David Steel MP, HC Deb, 22 July 1966, vol. 732, col. 1067.
10 P. Diggory, J. Peel and M. Potts, ‘Preliminary assessment of the 1967 Abortion Act in practice’,
The Lancet, 295/7641, 7 Feb. 1970, pp. 287–91, at p. 291.
11 J. Morton Williams and K. Hindell, Abortion and Contraception: A Study of Patients’ Attitudes
(London, 1972), p. 22; Anthony Hordern, Legal Abortion: The English Experience (Oxford, 1971),
p. 90.
12 Hordern, Legal Abortion, p. 90.
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could imply that a decision taken by a pregnant woman would not be
a ‘considered’ or responsible one, and this indeed follows the binary
model laid down in the Act. In putting the decision in the hands of
doctors, the Act created a situation where doctors were characterized as
responsible and rational actors, while pregnant women were by extension
irresponsible and irrational, insufficiently ‘stable or rational to make
important reproductive decisions’.13 While some doctors supported a
woman’s right to choose and prioritised her wishes when making their
assessment, others felt strongly that she was in need of an expert to assess
and diagnose what was best in her particular situation. Some doubted that
a woman in such a ‘predicament’ would understand ‘what was in her best
interest’ and considered that a woman’s wishes might be different from
her ‘needs’; fearing that ‘by making abortion too readily available we do
little but relieve the patient’s immediate suffering for a short time and thus
do her no real service’.14
However, from the earliest days of the Act some doctors expressed
concern at the responsibility that had been placed on their shoulders,
believing that the Act offered confusion as well as ﬂexibility, and
potentially created difficulties for doctors and for the doctor–patient
relationship. Davis and Davidson have argued that policy-makers had
deﬂected responsibility on to the medical profession, many of whom
accepted the resulting ‘medicalization’ of abortion reluctantly, at least
at ﬁrst.15 Consultant gynaecologists, who had to perform the termination
and take legal responsibility for it, might ﬁnd deciding whether or not
to do so a grave and ‘onerous task’ that had nonetheless to be taken
quickly in an ‘emotion-charged situation’.16 Some feared the pressure of
trying to make an evaluation ‘while under considerable pressure in terms
of time, stress, and emotional atmosphere, yet at the same time giving the
patient the feeling that the investigation is disinterested and thorough’.17
Some felt that their medical training had not prepared them for making
decisions of this nature, noting that the Act gave the medical profession
‘considerable freedom to decide’ but only ‘vague criteria’ to follow,
meaning that doctors were ‘thrown into an unknown sea’ with ‘only their
own personalities, experiences, codes of ethics, religious scruples’ to guide
them.18
In 1971, the consultant psychiatrist Ingram wrote a piece for The
Lancet titled ‘Abortion Games’, in which he applied Eric Berne’s ‘game
13 Sheldon, Beyond Control, pp. 20, 24–5.
14 David Tunnadine and Roger Green, Unwanted Pregnancy: Accident or Illness? (Oxford, 1978),
p. 4;NorahM.Cogan, ‘Account of the environment: amedical social worker looks at the new abortion
law’, British Medical Journal, 5599/2, 27 April 1968, pp. 235–6, at p. 236.
15 G. Davis and R. Davidson, ‘ “A Fifth Freedom” or “Hideous Atheistic Expediency”? The
medical community and abortion law reform in Scotland, c. 1960–1975’,Medical History, 50 (2006),
pp. 29–48, at pp. 46–8.
16 M. Brudenell, ‘Foreword’, in Hordern, Legal Abortion, p. xi.
17 Cogan, ‘Account of the environment’, pp. 235–6.
18 Tunnadine and Green, Unwanted Pregnancy, p. 2.
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theory’ to the interactions and decision-making processes involved in
determining access to abortion.19 Ingram expressed a deep discomfort
with being ‘obliged to give opinions’ on matters he considered ‘non-
medical’ and felt that the ‘ambiguity’ of the Act disturbed both doctors
and patients, leading to ‘a fear of decision-making and to game playing’.20
In his article, Ingram outlined the concealed motives behind these
interactions and potential strategies available to all actors involved.
General practitioners could distance themselves from decision-making by
referring the woman in question to another doctor without advocating
for one outcome or another, or they could appear to do so but pass the
decision to a gynaecologist who had a particular reputation for either
approving or rejecting termination requests. Thus they could conceal their
judgement and avoid a confrontation with the patient. Gynaecologists
might delay appointments until the pregnancy was too advanced to
terminate (a game he called ‘Waiting List’), or might agree to undertake
the procedure only if the patient also agreed to a sterilization.21
In having to navigate these various doctor ‘games’, Ingram likened
the process of obtaining an abortion from the woman’s perspective to
an ‘obstacle race’. In a similar fashion, Laﬁtte of the British Pregnancy
Advisory Service spoke of it as an ‘abortion hurdle race’, where the
hurdles women had to overcome were ﬁrst the GP, and then the
consultant gynaecologist.22 Tensions were possible between doctors and
women seeking abortions if their interpretations of the situation did
not correspond. The potential for this could lead to a wariness of the
others’ motives, and create a situation where it might in fact be logical to
conceal one’s strategy and put on a performance, in order to achieve the
desired outcome. Ingram points to logical reasoning that might encourage
a woman to do this, noting that ‘honesty may not be rewarded’; ‘The
intelligent woman who weighs her life situation and decides rationally
and calmly that termination is necessary – that is, plays no games –
is less likely to succeed than her more emotional sister who chooses
to play “Psychiatric case” and produce the symptoms that the doctor
seeks to justify termination.’23 Therefore the Act and the interactions it
proscribes could become a self-fulﬁlling prophesy, as women might in
fact be incentivized to present as irrational and disordered in order to be
granted an abortion.
19 Ingram, ‘Abortion games’; Eric Berne,Games People Play: The Psychology ofHumanRelationships
(London, 1964). For further discussion of the ‘games’ outlined by Ingram and their effect on the
geographical disparity of abortion provision in Britain, see Gayle Davis, Jane O’Neill, Clare Parker
and Sally Sheldon, ‘All aboard the “Abortion Express”: geographic variability, domestic travel, and
the 1967 British Abortion Act’, in Christabelle Sethna and Gayle Davis (eds), Abortion Across
Borders: Transnational Travel and Access to Abortion Services (Baltimore, MD, forthcoming 2019).
20 Ingram, ‘Abortion games’.
21 Ibid.
22 BPAS, Abortion Hurdle Race.
23 Ingram, ‘Abortion games’, pp. 969–70.
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While doctors did not necessarily agree with Ingram,24 some echoed
his ﬁndings, noting that although ‘he approached the subject in a
lighthearted manner, his analysis of the way by which the doctor tries to
avoid making positive decisions about abortion are nonetheless true’.25
There are numerous other examples of doctors referring to the legally
necessary medical interview as a ‘pretence’ or ‘charade’, because the
pregnant woman is required to perform a speciﬁc role in order to meet
the recognized legal grounds for termination. The gynaecologist Peter
Diggory wrote of it in these terms in 1975, feeling that it was ‘humiliating
and degrading’ for a woman to have to ‘exaggerate her distress’ in order
to demonstrate adequate grounds for abortion: ‘if I’m faced with a girl
wanting an abortion why do I have to test how distressed she is? All I get
is a charade played out for me.’26
The ‘games’ or scenarios set out by Ingram and others can be
identiﬁed again and again in the various studies of abortion practice which
proliferated in the decades following the Act’s introduction, no doubt due
to its immediate and ongoing controversy. These highlight the signiﬁcance
of women’s interactions with their doctors and indicate howmuch control
the doctor had over the situation, potentially dominating the interaction
and controlling the outcome. They also give useful indications of the
criteria doctors used in decision-making, allowing an examination of
which categories of patient were viewed as sympathetic or alternatively
problematic. While certain trends can be clearly identiﬁed, ultimately the
scope for individual interpretation by doctors resulted in a high degree
of variability. Some did not feel the need to exert their own views or
judgements by adopting persuasive tactics; however, as Jeffrey Weeks has
noted, others were ‘far from being neutral servants of their patients’.27
Doctors had a signiﬁcant impact on the outcome and experiences of
patients seeking terminations, even when they did not overtly engage in
persuasion. Sally Sheldon notes that even a kind and sympathetic doctor
might ‘deploy power’ over the pregnant woman by ‘inﬂuencing her course
of action, rather than facilitating her arrival at her own decision’ and
that the system of legal regulation inscribed by the Act left her ‘in a
particularly weak position to counteract the exercise of such inﬂuence’.28
Sally Macintyre’s 1970s study of single and pregnant women in Scotland
illustrates how clearly the attitudes and advice of doctors could set the
parameters of the medical interview, and therefore the options open to
young pregnant women. Only half the women interviewed knew without
24 In a subsequent Lancet issue Dugald Baird criticized Ingram’s portrayal of the Act and its
interactions between doctors and patients as inappropriate, ﬁnding ‘nothing fundamentally wrong’
with the AbortionAct, though he did assert that ‘problems’ arose in the way it was applied by doctors.
Dugald Baird, ‘Abortion games’, The Lancet, 298/7734, 20 Nov. 1971, p. 1145.
25 Eleanor M. Briggs and Alison E. Mack, ‘Termination of pregnancy in the unmarried’, Scottish
Medical Journal, 17/21 (1972), pp. 399–400, at p. 399.
26 Peter Diggory, Guardian, 6 Feb. 1975.
27 J. Weeks, Sex, Politics and Society: The Regulation of Sexuality since 1800 (Harlow, 1989), p. 260.
28 Sheldon, Beyond Control, p. 67.
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their doctor mentioning it that legal termination was an option, which
is signiﬁcant because only two of the GPs interviewed reported that they
discussed all the available options including termination.29 This placed
the onus on women to introduce the discussion. The Lane Committee
on the Working of the Abortion Act (1971–4) found similarly that the
option of termination was not necessarily discussed by GPs, and also that
in particular young women were reluctant to approach their GPs in the
ﬁrst place, fearing negative attitudes, or perhaps that they might inform
their family.30
Examples of outright persuasion were not uncommon. One of the
doctors interviewed by Macintyre asserted that he was able to persuade
the ‘majority of girls, those I’ve known since they were children’ to
get married rather than abort, stating that although occasionally he
did have patients ‘demanding termination’, ‘most can be talked out of
it’.31 Other studies also found that a long-standing relationship with
a doctor increased the likelihood that the patient could be persuaded;
Tunnadine andGreen found that in doctors who had a principled position
either for or against termination, a ‘good doctor–patient relationship’
would lead to the ‘convertability of the patient to his ideas and she
will carry out his instructions’.32 Allen’s 1980s study suggested that
young people were particularly vulnerable to being persuaded and
‘overpowered’ by doctors, and more mature patients sometimes felt
they had to be very ﬁrm in their convictions in order to receive the
outcome they wanted: ‘You know what little demi-gods doctors are . . .
I felt I had the power to think for myself and not be inﬂuenced by
him.’33 Many of the women Allen interviewed reported what they felt
were attempts to override and intimidate them, one recounting that ‘He
tried to make me feel like a six year-old with no opinions. Everything
I said he twisted to have another meaning’ and in another case, ‘he
was telling me my brain had made a mistake and I really wanted to
keep the baby . . . He was using people who can’t have children to
get at me’.34 Half of the medical professionals that Allen interviewed
reported that they would ‘attempt to dissuade a woman from abortion’,
with GPs most likely to do so. Mirroring Ingram’s concerns regarding
referral, theGPswere likely to say that they wouldmake a referral without
supporting the request, and almost three quarters asserted that ‘there were
circumstances in which they would’ dissuade women from abortion.35
29 Macintyre, Single and Pregnant, pp. 93, 74–5.
30 Report of the Committee on the Working of the Abortion Act, vol. III, Cmnd. 5579 (London,
1974), p. 76; BPAS, Abortion Hurdle Race.
31 Macintyre, Single and Pregnant, p. 75.
32 Tunnadine and Green, Unwanted Pregnancy, p. 144.
33 Isobel Allen, Counselling Services for Sterilisation, Vasectomy and Termination of Pregnancy
(London, 1985), p. 164.
34 Ibid., pp. 169–70.
35 Ibid., pp. 284–5.
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Aswell as revealing great variation in the attitudes of doctors consulted,
such studies identiﬁed particular trends in terms of which categories
of patient were more likely to be accepted for termination, and which
situations would elicit the most sympathy. Some doctors stated openly
that ‘Sympathy – or lack of it – often determined the decision that
was made’.36 While doctors referred to various practical criteria in
coming to their decision, their assessment of these was subject to their
own personal interpretation, and in some cases moral judgements.
Numerous studies, including one in Wessex in 1980, found that though
gynaecologists might refer to the same criteria when coming to a decision,
the assessments they made as to the signiﬁcance of these ‘were more of
an individual matter’.37 Extremes of age and perceived intelligence usually
merited consideration, as did the circumstances of conception and
the pregnant woman’s relationship with her sexual partner.38 Key topics
raised by doctors in order to help make their decision included the
possibility of alternatives to abortion (with marriage almost always
raised with single women), the pregnant woman’s home background, her
education or career, her relationship with the putative father, and her
sexual and contraceptive history.
Women seeking terminations might be viewed and treated very
differently by doctors according to their age, marital status and sexual
history. In a 1982 Glasgow Herald article on barriers to treatment, a
West End GP noted the difficulty he had in getting his patients approved
at hospitals in the area: ‘Sometimes we manage to get a termination
locally for women in their forties with large families but hardly ever
for young unmarried girls.’39 Reaffirming this depiction, the Chairman
of the gynaecological department at the local hospital stated that he
found performing abortions ‘very distasteful’, and that ‘it is very difficult
to terminate a pregnancy without good reason . . . I am not prepared
to carry out the operation on a young unmarried woman just because
it would be inconvenient for her to have the baby.’40 The plight of
the young single woman is highlighted in numerous other studies from
the 1970s and 1980s. Allen’s large English study found ‘evidence of
much less sympathy on the part of GPs towards the younger girls’,
noting that married, divorced, widowed and separated women, and
women with children, were much more likely to ﬁnd their GPs helpful.41
Although married women appeared to be treated more sympathetically
regardless, the most sympathy was reserved for those who were older and
36 Discussing views expressed at a symposium on the working of the Abortion Act held in February
1969, Hordern, Legal Abortion, p. 116.
37 J. R. Ashton,K. J. Dennis,W. E.Waters, AudreyChamberlain, R.G.Rowe andMaggie J.Wheeller,
‘The Wessex abortion studies: II, attitudes of consultant gynaecologists to provision of abortion
services’, The Lancet, 315/8160, 19 Jan. 1980, pp. 140–2, at p. 140.
38 Hordern, Legal Abortion, pp. 86–90.
39 Glasgow Herald, 10 Aug. 1982.
40 Ibid.
41 Allen, Counselling Services, p. 162.
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already had completed families.42 Hammil and Ingram’s 1974 Glasgow
study of abortion decisions found similarly that those recommended for
termination tended to be older, married and to have children. When
discussing the reasons doctors in their study did not agree with or approve
terminations, they found that ‘the hard core of dissent is the single girl’
and that ‘this group provokes the most moralistic response from the
profession’. Comparing their results with two earlier large-scale studies of
termination practice conducted in London and Glasgow, they concluded
that ‘whatever the degree of “liberality”, the core of refusals is formed
by young single women pregnant for the ﬁrst time’ and that this was the
group that was deemed ‘most controversial’ and most often terminated
privately.43
In order to navigate these particularly censorious judgements, then,
young single women seeking terminations had to be particularly skilled
in convincing doctors that they deserved an abortion. One of the most
successful narratives according to Macintyre’s study was that of ‘nice
girl who made a mistake’, and in order to be classiﬁed as such doctors
looked for ‘evidence that they had tried to use contraception, the account
(if believed) that intercourse had taken place only once when drunk
or under pressure, lack of evidence of promiscuity, and a demeanour of
shame or regret in the consultation’.44 In such circumstances, a woman
might be regarded as a good girl who had been unlucky or made a
mistake – though marriage would be considered the more appropriate
outcome if the relationship was sufficiently stable. On the other hand,
if women were ‘believed to have slept only with casual acquaintances or
strangers, they were seen as bad, promiscuous girls who did not deserve an
abortion’.45 Similar language and practices are present in numerous
studies, with one of Williams and Hindell’s interviewees stating ‘I
convinced the consultant I wasn’t the typewho sleeps around and deserves
it.’46
Another group that faced particular difficulties, often overlapping with
the ﬁrst, were women with repeat unwanted pregnancies. These requests
for termination often engendered the most judgemental responses.
Hordern noted in 1971 that such cases were ‘difficult to assess’ but that
repeated unplanned pregnancies were ‘not uncommon in the impulsive,
the psychopathic and the unintelligent’.47 Allen noted numerous instances
in her 1980s study of doctors warning women (particularly young women)
who came in for abortions that they would not be seen a second time.48
42 Ibid., p. 272.
43 E. Hamill and I. Ingram, ‘Psychiatric and social factors in the abortion decision’, British Medical
Journal, 1/5901, 9 Feb. 1974, pp. 229–32, at p. 231.
44 Macintyre, Single and Pregnant, p. 85.
45 Ibid., pp. 74–5.
46 Williams and Hindell, Abortion and Contraception, p. 23.
47 Hordern, Legal Abortion, p. 90.
48 Women quoting statements that doctors made to them: ‘We only allow one mistake. We don’t
bother with the next one. We just won’t do it’ (Allen, Counselling Services, pp. 167, 170–1).
C© 2018 The Author History published by The Historical Association and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
10 ‘ABORTION GAMES’
Macintyre noted that the ‘reluctance of gynaecologists to terminate the
pregnancies of single womenwho have had previous abortions is still often
based on the concepts of deservingness and undeservingness’.49 Doctors
seemed wary of inadvertently appearing to condone the use of abortion as
contraception, which was how they tended to interpret repeat unwanted
pregnancies. The case of a seventeen-year-old with learning difficulties
living in an overcrowded homewho, despite a supportive recommendation
from her GP was refused a termination from a hospital consultant due
to her having had a termination the previous year, was reported in the
press. The hospital consultant had asserted that ‘abortion should not
be used as a means of contraception’ and while her GP agreed he felt
that this response lacked compassion and was inappropriate in these
particular circumstances: ‘what the girl needed was immediate help and
careful contraceptive education’.50 The consultant had made a judgement
that she had shown a pattern of irresponsible behaviour, and therefore did
not ‘deserve’ an abortion, and because of this she was denied help despite
the difficulty of her situation.
Perceived class and educational level often appeared signiﬁcant in
determining the likelihood of a woman obtaining an abortion, with the
outcome being less likely ‘the lower their social class and the poorer their
education’.51 Ingram noted two reasons that this was likely to be the case:
ﬁrstly because similarity in class between doctor and patient encouraged
empathy (‘Doctors sympathise more readily with the situation of those
girls who might easily be their daughters’) and also because middle-class
women tended to be ‘more knowledgeable about the law, better able to
put their case across convincingly, and more skilled in doctor/patient
games’.52 Hence they had less need to manipulate the medical interview,
though they were also more likely to be able to do so convincingly
if necessary. Many studies of abortion supported this contention. For
instance, the Lane Committee found that working-class women were less
likely to be accepted for termination and signiﬁcantly more likely to face
delays, noting that this difference could not be explained simply by their
relative lack of recourse to private clinics.53 The needs of middle-class,
educated women in skilled jobs were often seen to be more pressing than
those of their sisters in semi-skilled and unskilled work.54 Hordern put
this particularly starkly: ‘A woman of low socio-economic status in an
unskilled or semi-skilled job may tolerate an unwanted pregnancy better
than her counterpart in a responsible professional job; the latter, being
higher in the social scale, has farther to fall.’55
49 Macintyre, Single and Pregnant, pp. 74–5.
50 Glasgow Herald, 10 Aug. 1982.
51 BPAS, Abortion Hurdle Race.
52 Ingram, ‘Abortion games’, pp. 969–70.
53 Report of the Committee, pp. 14, 33.
54 Roger Davidson and Gayle Davis, The Sexual State: Sexuality and Scottish Governance, 1950–80
(Edinburgh, 2014), p. 114; Macintyre, ‘The medical profession’, p. 132.
55 Hordern, Legal Abortion, p. 87.
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The period of gestation could also be signiﬁcant in decision-making,
as a mitigating factor for any of the criteria discussed above. Numerous
studies showed that doctors might agree to terminate for a greater range
of reasons earlier on in the pregnancy, when the procedure was more
straightforward. For instance, a 1974 investigation found ‘an informal
agreement’ between gynaecologists and psychiatrists not to recommend
termination after twelve weeks ‘except for compelling reasons’, and a 1980
study of gynaecologist attitudes in Wessex showed a dramatic decline in
the willingness to terminate on socio-medical rather than strictly medical
grounds after twelve weeks’ gestation.56 This indicates that women were
much more likely to obtain an abortion if they presented early enough,
and also illustrates how ‘Waiting List’ games, highlighted by Ingram,
could be so powerful in inﬂuencing the outcome of termination decisions.
The Lane Committee reported in 1974 that GPs ‘might have deliberately
adopted delaying tactics in the hope that pregnancy would be accepted,
or that it would be too late to get an abortion’.57 It could be difficult of
course to determine whether appointments were delayed due to pressure
on resources or doctor ambivalence, but women who faced delays often
felt that this was deliberate.58
These studies clearly demonstrate evidence for Ingram’s assertion that
the medical interview necessitated by the Act appeared to encourage
‘game playing’ and performance from both doctors and women seeking
terminations. Each might conceal the motives and reasoning behind their
behaviours, and be suspicious of the words and actions of the other.
Williams and Hindell found that the women in their study had both
overt and covert reasons for seeking terminations; the overt reasons were
the ‘respectable’ ones put forward to doctors ‘in order to obtain the
abortion’, and were shaped by their expectations of what would be the
most ‘acceptable’ reasons according to the medical profession and society
at large. For example, their respondents ‘tended to believe that desertion
by the father was a particularly acceptable reason . . . and a few conﬁded
that they had claimed desertion by the boyfriend in order to obtain
the abortion when it was not true’.59 A well-documented way in which
women could tailor their narratives better to ﬁt doctor expectations of
attempted ‘responsibility’ was through stories of contraceptive failure.
Women’s testimonies sometimes revealed explicitly how they might turn
an everyday situation in which unwanted pregnancy might result (‘we’d
run out of durex and I, at least, knew it was risky’) to a sympathetic story
in which they felt they might be seen as more ‘deserving’: ‘The story I later
recounted to various doctors was rather different as I soon learnt that this
type of “irresponsibility” is just the thing that doctors think should be
56 Hamill and Ingram, ‘Psychiatric and social factors’, p. 230; Ashton et al., ‘Wessex abortion
studies’, p. 141.
57 Report of the Committee, p. 76.
58 See examples cited in Colin Francome, Abortion Practice in Britain and the US (London,
1986), p. 55; Williams and Hindell, Abortion and Contraception, pp. 18–19.
59 Williams and Hindell, Abortion and Contraception, pp. 11–13.
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punished by unwilling childbearing. They react much better to sad tales
of contraceptive failure.’60
This of course did not mean that women’s stories would be believed.
Doctors were aware that ‘ideas about “the type of case most likely to
elicit sympathy from a GP” were prevalent in the lay community’ and
were therefore wary of fabricated or embroidered stories that they felt
might be designed to elicit sympathy. Macintyre found that several GPs
in her study were ‘sceptical about claims of accidental or occasional
intercourse’, believing these might be an ‘attempt to appear respectable
and to blame the pregnancy on bad luck rather than bad behaviour’.61
These GPs based their assessment on ‘inferred moral character’ from the
woman’s sexual and contraceptive history, ‘how well they thought they
knew’ the patient and ‘whether they regarded them as manipulative’.62
Several doctors appeared to view patient information on contraceptive
history as likely to be fabricated; one study noted that the ‘evidence on
contraceptives must be treated with reserve, for it is much easier to say
that contraceptives were used and failed than to admit they were not used’
and another that ‘bad luck was a far less common occurrence than many
of the women would have the doctor believe’.63 Tunnadine and Green felt
that there was ‘considerable manipulation by both patient and doctor to
gain the ascendency’ in these interactions, and that a patient in ‘desperate
straits’ would go to ‘any lengths in furtherance of her goal’ and ‘will order,
cajole, wheedle, or use any device which will suit her purpose’.64 In some
circumstances doctors thought that women might ‘exert moral pressure’
by threatening suicide (sometimes described as ‘blackmail’).65
The variability resulting from these individual interpretations was
widely recognized. A 1973 Aberdeen study found that it was not possible
to ‘reach a common policy’ on termination decisions because ‘the
gynaecologists differed so much in their evaluation’.66 Women seeking
abortions were also well aware that ‘abortion was easier for some than
for others depending upon their circumstances and the attitudes’ of the
doctors consulted, and ‘tended to feel that obtaining an abortion was
largely a matter of luck’.67 While some doctors might exert pressure
on the pregnant woman to follow their own interpretation, sympathetic
60 ‘Liz’ in Brent against Corrie Pamphlet Group,Mixed Feelings: Ten Women Talk about Their Own
Experience of Pregnancy and Abortion (London, 1980), p. 28.
61 Macintyre, Single and Pregnant, p. 81.
62 Ibid., p. 83.
63 M. Clark, I. Forstner, D. A. Pond and R. F. Tredgold, ‘Sequels of unwanted pregnancy: a follow-
up of patients referred for psychiatric opinion’, The Lancet, 292/7566, 31 Aug. 1968, pp. 501–3,
at p. 501; Tunnadine and Green, Unwanted Pregnancy, pp. 32, 106.
64 Tunnadine and Green, Unwanted Pregnancy, pp. 105–6.
65 Hordern, Legal Abortion, pp. 81–3. This had long been recognized as a possible persuasive tactic,
with evidence of doctors coaching women to stress the risk of suicide in order to obtain abortion
being discussed in the Committee stage of the Bill that became the Abortion Act, see K. Hindell and
M. Simms, Abortion Law Reformed (London, 1971), p. 183.
66 Macintyre, Single and Pregnant, p. 23.
67 Williams and Hindell, Abortion and Contraception, p. 18.
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doctors might attempt to assist women by helping them shape their
narratives to ﬁt the terms of the Act, ensuring their reasons mapped
on to the legal criteria. The interview with the psychiatrist Dr Bloom
recorded in the largely discredited study Babies for Burning provides a
useful illustration of this.68 Despite over ninety questions being asked in
the extended medical interview, the anti-abortion authors Litchﬁeld and
Kentish critiqued his effort to shape the answers they gave to ﬁt the criteria
of the Act as a ‘farce’ and as evidence that abortion on demand was
being practised by some doctors, at least in the private sector.69 Indeed,
Litchﬁeld and Kentish reported being informed by a number of service
providers that their case would not be refused in the private sector, even
if they would not stand ‘an earthly chance’ in the NHS.70
NHS doctors might be particularly strict in making their assessment
of appropriate criteria for termination due to pressure on resources. The
Abortion Act placed signiﬁcantly increased pressure on gynaecological
services which had not been adequately prepared to meet the new
demand, and it was recognized from the earliest years that this could
‘embarrass’ already strained resources and ‘lead to difficult decisions
regarding priorities for admission’.71 Comments of gynaecologists in the
1980 Wessex study indicated that pressure on resources might prevent
them from operating as liberally as they might wish, with one asserting
that ‘My personal feeling is very nearly “abortion on demand”. I have
such a heavy gynae workload that I cannot provide it and am thus
forced to be selective.’72 The private sector was an option for some
women, and charitable abortion services which offered terminations
at a lower cost also began operating in regions across England and
Wales where NHS acceptance rates were limited.73 Many studies record
GPs encouraging women who were able to take this path. While such
encouragement was purportedly to eliminate the delay and rigmarole
that often characterized NHS abortions, GPs’ motives in making this
suggestion were not necessarily entirely focused on the well-being of the
patient. Allen noted in her 1985 study that in some casesGPs were actively
‘trying to put pressure on the woman to go privately if she could afford
it’, and found some clear instances of doctors exercising their own moral
judgements and concepts of ‘deservingness’ to delimit access via theNHS,
such as a GP who told a patient who had been raped by her estranged
husband that she could ‘try the NHS, but it’s not an illness and people
68 For a fuller discussion of Babies for Burning and the subsequent legal proceedings, see Sally
Sheldon, Gayle Davis, Jane O’Neill and Clare Parker, ‘The Abortion Act (1967): a biography’, Legal
Studies (n.d.), pp. 1–18. doi:10.1017/lst.2018.28.
69 Ibid.; M. Litchﬁeld and S. Kentish, Babies for Burning: The Abortion Business in Britain (London,
1974), pp. 80–9.
70 Sheldon et al., ‘Abortion Act’.
71 Philip H. Addison, ‘The Abortion Act 1967’, The Lancet, 292/7566, 31 Aug. 1968, pp. 503–7,
at p. 504; Hordern, Legal Abortion, p. 113.
72 Ashton et al., ‘Wessex abortion studies’, p. 141.
73 Sheldon et al., ‘Abortion Act’.
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should pay for it if it’s a conscience thing. You’ve made a mistake so you
ought to pay for it.’74
Ultimately, in many cases, no matter what pressure doctors were under
and no matter how the pregnant woman might be able to use covert
strategies and performance to attempt to inﬂuence the decision, the
outcome of the medical interview was a foregone conclusion if the doctor
consulted was one who had a ﬁrm ethical belief in either supporting
the woman’s right to choose, or preserving the pregnancy at all costs.
Tunnadine and Green explored the means by which a doctor who is
ﬁrmly ‘either for or against performing an abortion’ would ‘manipulate
the situation’ by interpreting any account the pregnant womanmight give
as a conﬁrmation of their own point of view, resulting in a ‘Catch 22’
situation.75 They termed this situation ‘absurd’, though they noted that
as ‘compensation, many of the women knew with what sort of doctor
they were dealing and, therefore, could ensure by selection that they got
what they wanted’.76 This was the key way in which women might be able
to circumvent the wishes of doctors who attempted to persuade them
to continue with an unwanted pregnancy, but it relied on them having
sufficient knowledge of the sympathies of doctors and service providers
to whom they had access.77
The potential absurdity of this situation had been highlighted by
doctors from the earliest years of the Act. As early as 1968, some doctors
were pointing to evidence that ‘a determined, desperate woman will
somehow abort’ regardless of being turned down at her ﬁrst attempt,
and using this to ask: ‘If she is so determined, and impervious to her
doctor’s advice to the contrary, is it then better for him to acquiesce . . .
would not her health be best maintained by leaving the ﬁnal decision to
her?’78 Numerous other studies revealed that most who were refused did
eventually obtain an abortion elsewhere, and also pointed to evidence
from follow-up studies indicating that while signiﬁcant psychiatric
complications resulting from terminations of pregnancy were rare, ‘cases
of depression and appreciable social distress occur in the refused group’.
This again pointed to the fact that in spite of the ‘careful attempts at
informed decision making’ on the part of doctors who proffered refusals,
‘the bulk of women seeking an abortion achieve their end’.79
In this way, time and evidence from follow-up studies of termination
outcomes moderated many doctors’ viewpoints, and in turn further
inﬂuenced practice. Hordern was reporting as early as 1971 that a
‘majority’ of gynaecologists ‘slowly came to view termination of
74 Allen, Counselling Services, p. 143; see also Williams and Hindell, Abortion and Contraception.
75 Tunnadine and Green, Unwanted Pregnancy, p. 115.
76 Ibid.
77 The ability to ‘select’ a doctor with a favourable viewpoint is by no means certain; with no
registered list of conscientious objectors, it is ‘normally impossible’ for a woman without inside
knowledge to predict the outcome of her request. Sheldon, Beyond Control, p. 59.
78 Clark et al., ‘Sequels of unwanted pregnancy’, p. 503.
79 Hamill and Ingram, ‘Psychiatric and social factors’, p. 231.
C© 2018 The Author History published by The Historical Association and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
JANE O’NEILL 15
pregnancy on psychiatric grounds if not with approval, at least as being
justiﬁed in many cases’.80 Some practitioners giving evidence to the Lane
Committee asserted that abortion on request was ‘in the best interest of
the woman’.81 Many doctors interviewed by Allen in the 1980s spoke of
the way their own practice had changed over time. A doctor who described
themselves as having undergone ‘a very considerable evolution’ reported
that in the immediate wake of the Act’s introduction they had tried, often
successfully, ‘to counsel and discuss and actually to dissuade’, and though
at ﬁrst everyone had seemed ‘thrilled’ with the decision not to terminate,
‘time and time again’ circumstances became difficult. After ﬁnding that
‘[t]hose who came back with the fewest problems were the ones where I’d
gone along with what they wanted in the ﬁrst place’, this doctor began
to centre the woman’s wishes in coming to a termination decision.82
Numerous medical professionals involved in counselling found that
because their experience had indicated that ‘signiﬁcant regrets’ following
terminations were rare, and unwanted children could lead to ‘great
pain and unhappiness for everyone concerned’, over the years ‘they had
become more ready to accept a woman’s request for termination’.83
In fact, across this periodmany doctors were organized in campaigning
groups such as Doctors for a Woman’s Choice on Abortion (DWCA),
founded in Edinburgh in 1976 to support legal change to give women the
right to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy, believing that the
doctor’s role should be to provide information.84 In general terms, medical
views appeared to be liberalizing. A 1989 study of gynaecologist attitudes
found that 73% agreed with the ‘principle of a woman’s right to choose,
in consultation with her doctor, whether or not to have an abortion’.85
This suggests that a signiﬁcant majority of doctors might be basing their
decisions on the woman’s wishes, with many more feeling able to operate
on this basis than was evident in the early years of the Act. More doctors
have called openly for a change to the Act to introduce a woman’s right
to choose, at least in the ﬁrst twelve weeks, with Paintin advocating in the
British Medical Journal in 1992 for a change in the law to bring Britain
into line with other European countries.86 Recent studies have indicated
that the authority and decision-making power of women is now generally
considered paramount, with one ﬁnding evidence that doctors sometimes
80 Hordern, Legal Abortion, p. 123.
81 AshleyWivel, ‘Abortion policy and politics on the Lane Committee of Enquiry, 1971–1974’, Social
History of Medicine 11/1 (1998), pp. 109–35, at p. 125.
82 Allen, Counselling Services, p. 272.
83 Ibid., p. 344.
84 Anna Gurun, ‘Second-wave feminist approaches to sexuality in Britain and France, c.1970–
c.1983’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Dundee (2015), pp. 62–3.
85 W. Savage and C. Francome, ‘Gynaecologists’ attitudes to abortion’, The Lancet, 334/8675, 2 Dec.
1990, pp. 1323–4, at p. 1324.
86 David Paintin, ‘Abortion in the ﬁrst trimester: give women the right to choose’, British Medical
Journal, 305/6860, 24 Oct. 1992, pp. 967–8, at p. 968.
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try to conceal their legal decision-making role from women in order to
avoid giving the impression that they need to be persuaded.87
Of course, despite this general trend, the maintenance of the legal
situation allowing considerable medical control and discretion has
ensured that the practice and experience of termination decisions
have remained variable. While a growing majority of Allen’s medical
interviewees felt that ‘It is the woman’s decision and it is reasonable that
she should be able to achieve it without a harrowing cross-examination’,
a minority of doctors still appeared to relish the powerful position they
were in and use it to dissuade women: ‘I’m afraid I make a meal of
it . . . It should be a long discussion covering the grounds – there have
to be legal grounds . . . I distinguish between the legal and right and
wrong. It is legal, but I’d say it’s wrong’.88 Some doctors retained a belief
that pregnant women could not be trusted to take responsible decisions,
maintaining that the very fact that a woman has come to experience
unwanted pregnancy is ‘self-evident’ proof that she is given to ‘impulsive
behaviour and sudden changes of mind’ which ‘must make a doctor
wonder as to her stability and maturity’.89 Tunnadine and Green felt that
this ‘reinforces the need for the doctor to take the responsibility for the
decision, no matter how adamant or persuasive the patient’.90
In the later period we can still see evidence of particular categories
of women or situations inﬂuencing the outcome and experience of
termination decisions. Even some self-identifying liberal feminist doctors
did not necessarily support a woman’s right to choose in all circumstances.
Greenhalgh, a London GP who had ‘marched and lobbied in support
of a woman’s right to choose’, nonetheless raised the issue in the British
Medical Journal in 1992 of a situation in which she could not bring herself
to sign the form to approve termination – namely a middle-class mother
who requested a termination so that her pregnancy would not interfere
with a planned skiing holiday.91 She justiﬁed this apparent conﬂict by
saying though she ‘did not for a moment dispute her [patient’s] absolute
right to do what she liked’ with regard to her pregnancy, she could not
become ‘party to the conspiracy’ by signing her name to it, asserting that ‘I
amnot a rubber stamp. I ama thinking and feeling professional and Imust
live with the clinical, and ethical decisions I make. I, the doctor, also have
a right to choose.’92 The idea of supporting a woman’s right to choose,
but only under certain circumstances, raised debate in succeeding issues
of the BritishMedical Journal. Greenhalgh was accused of failing to place
principle before prejudice by arbitrarily imposing ‘her own inverse poor
87 Ellie Lee, Sally Sheldon and Jan Macvarish, ‘The 1967 Abortion Act ﬁfty years on: abortion,
medical authority and the law revisited’, Social Science and Medicine, 212 (2018), pp. 26–32, at p. 30.
88 Allen, Counselling Services, p. 273.
89 Tunnadine and Green, Unwanted Pregnancy, pp. 116–17.
90 Ibid.
91 T. Greenhalgh, ‘The doctor’s right to choose’, British Medical Journal, 305/6879, 8 Aug.
1992, p. 371.
92 Ibid.
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law concept of “the undeserving rich” ’. However, it was also recognized
that this situation highlighted ongoing difficulties with the Act and its
requirement for doctors to take responsibility for the decision, when it
was pointed out that a law allowing women termination on request up to
twelve weeks would spare doctors such ‘embarrassing situations’.93 Under
such a law, the termination decision would explicitly reﬂect the woman’s
wishes, and not implicate the doctor and their professional ethics and
responsibilities.
Numerous sources including the advice of pro-choice groups aimed
at women seeking terminations, the personal testimonies of women who
sought and obtained abortions, and further surveys and studies of the
later period all point to certain ongoing continuities. The advice that
pro-choice groups and publications produced to help women seeking
terminations recognized clearly that there might need to be a process of
concerted negotiation with doctors, and mirrored some of the ‘games’
highlighted by Ingram decades earlier. Advice in the 1980s and 1990s still
emphasized the variability of doctors’ views and practice, and the possible
need for women to be proactive, to push for referrals and appointments,
and perhaps change doctor in order to get a termination. A National
Abortion Campaign leaﬂet of the period gave detailed information on
this to help women who might be put off by doctors or subjected to the
‘waiting list’. The leaﬂet encouraged women to ask their GPs about staff
attitudes at their local hospital and push for speedy referral appointments,
warning that some GPs ‘will not tell you that they do not approve of
abortion – they just send you to a gynaecologist they know will refuse
you permission’ and noting that the ﬁnal recourse of every woman facing
difficulty was to go to a private or charity clinic.94 The potential for delays,
particularly on the NHS, due to the sometimes judgemental or unhelpful
actions of medical professionals was consistently raised in pro-choice
campaigning materials. Advice in a feminist zine from the early 1990s
presented a similar picture, encouraging women to be assertive if they
suspected their doctor might be opposed to abortion or using ‘delaying
tactics’, warning women against getting too close to the twelve-week limit
for early abortions. Their main takeaway was not to give up or back down
in the face of obstruction: ‘You will get an abortion if you really want
one.’95
Women’s testimonies also reveal the great disparity of views and
sympathies they encountered from various medical professionals.
Testimonies of abortion experiences across the decades display
remarkable continuities. Seeking an NHS abortion aged sixteen in
1978, Rosalind considered herself ‘lucky’ her GP was sympathetic, but
felt that the gynaecologist she was referred to treated her ‘like scum’,
93 Alex Scott-Samuel and James Campbell, ‘Letters: The doctor’s right to choose’, British Medical
Journal, 305/6853, 5 Sept. 1992, p. 589.
94 National Abortion Campaign (NAC), How to Get an Abortion, undated.
95 Harpies and Quines: The Abortion Issue, 8, Aug./Sept. 1993, p. 18.
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telling her that she had ‘fallen by the wayside’. Though consent to operate
was given, she felt this was ‘reluctant’ and ‘left his office with a deep
sense of shame’.96 In a testimony collected in 1993, Charlotte recounted
numerous obstructive and hostile interactions with medical professionals,
having to change her GP due to his anti-abortion views, waiting ﬁve
weeks in ‘sheer hell’ to get a termination appointment before facing
disapproving hospital staff, and then being sent home with a ‘seriously
high dose contraceptive pill (due to my obvious irresponsibility)’.97 These
accounts of two young single women across decades show remarkable
similarities, revealing ongoing assessments of ‘deservingness’ related to
perceptions of ‘responsibility’. Interestingly, both successfully achieved
the termination decision they wanted, but still experienced judgement
from some doctors, which increased their feelings of guilt. This supports
Fran Amery’s assertion that the Act’s requirement for doctors to act
as gatekeepers ‘has a disempowering effect on women, whether or
not requests for an abortion are granted’.98 Seeking an abortion as
a married thirty-year-old without children, Lucia did not obtain a
termination on the NHS, ﬁnding that the doctors she consulted did not
sympathize with her request for an abortion because they did not view her
as a particularly needy case.99 When the NHS gynaecologist she consulted
found she was just over twelve weeks’ pregnant, she was informed that
it was ‘too late’ and rushed home distraught, before ultimately paying
for an abortion privately and having a positive experience with the clinic
staff there.100
It appears from evidence of the later period that while developments
are evident there are also important continuities. A 1997 survey of NHS
abortion services found that the availability of terminations in NHS
hospitals was still ‘directly related to the willingness of key consultant
gynaecologists to carry it out’, and also found evidence of doctors
‘steering women’ to the private fee-paying sector in a process of ‘informal
means testing’.101 Certain categories of women seeking abortions were
still viewed as problematic, even if these differed slightly from earlier
constructions of sympathetic and unsympathetic cases. Duration of
pregnancy is still a mitigating factor in making decisions to terminate,
with ‘later’ terminations viewed as a ‘problematic decision’ by healthcare
96 NAC and Marie Stopes International, Voices for Choice: Women Recollect their Experiences of
Abortion in Britain 1936–1997 (London, 1997).
97 Harpies and Quines, p. 20.
98 Amery, ‘Solving the “woman problem” ’, p. 556.
99 ‘You’re thirty, you’re married, you’ve got a job, so what’s your problem?’, Lucia, describing
reactions to her abortion request in 1997, in NAC and Marie Stopes International, Voices for
Choice, n.p.n.
100 Ibid. Other studies have recorded women having on average more pleasant experiences in the
charity and private sectors, feeling that they received greater sympathy and were given more time
and space to talk. Allen, Counselling Services, pp. 174–5.
101 Abortion Law Reform Association, A Report on NHS Abortion Services (London, 1997).
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professionals except in cases of diagnosed foetal abnormality.102 In line
with the case discussed by Greenhalgh and Lucia’s 1997 experience,
Sian Beynon-Jones has found that, rather than the young single girl,
the middle-class married and perhaps childless woman seeking abortion
might now be looked upon with the least amount of sympathy and the
most suspicion.103
Under the situation created by the 1967 Abortion Act, women
are ‘dependent on the goodwill of the doctor to secure access to a
termination’.104 The level of discretion and scope for interpretation
this left open to doctors has led to immense variability of experiences
according to individual views and practice. Doctors have been able to
exercise their professional decision-making power in overt and covert
ways to persuade the women of the beneﬁts or otherwise of termination.
This has meant that interactions with healthcare professionals might
be viewed by pregnant women as ‘tests’, leading to distrust between
women and doctors, and instead facilitating subterfuge and performance.
Though many women reported positive interactions with medical staff
in the process of having a termination, the need to be seen by and gain
approval from (at least) two doctors increased the likelihood of women
encountering negative and judgemental medical reactions.
This very variability makes it difficult to chart and generalize about
clear patterns over time. However, it is clear that despite the two-doctor
rule still remaining in place ﬁfty years later, a ‘gap has opened up between
law and practice’, with doctors becoming ‘increasingly liberal in their
attitudes to abortion and less inclined to impose barriers to access’.105 The
majority of abortions in England andWales are nowprovided by charities,
under contract from the NHS, operating with ‘an explicitly pro-choice
vision’.106 While the interpretations of individual doctors may still vary, it
is signiﬁcant that in the approach to the ﬁftieth anniversary of the Act, key
medical bodies such as the BritishMedical Association, the Royal College
of Midwives, and the Royal College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, have
all stated their support for the decriminalization of abortion.107
In general, the interactions between doctors and women seeking
terminations have come to be understood in a more functional way over
time. Studies of abortion practice have revealed changing approaches
from women as well as medical professionals, with several women giving
‘the impression that they were ticking off the consultations in their
102 S.M. Beynon-Jones, ‘Timing is everything: the demarcation of later abortions in Scotland’, Social
Studies of Science, 42/1 (2012), pp. 53–74.
103 Abortion was ‘portrayed as understandable for those patients who are young and/or who
lack stable relationships . . . Conversely, health professionals problematise abortion requests made
by “older”, childless and/or middle-class women.’ S. M. Beynon-Jones, ‘Expecting motherhood?
Stratifying reproduction in 21st-century Scottish abortion practice’, Sociology, 47/3 (2013), pp. 509–
25, at p. 520.
104 Sheldon, Beyond Control, p, 65.
105 Amery, ‘Solving the “woman problem” ’, p. 556.
106 Sheldon et al., ‘Abortion Act’.
107 Lee et al., ‘1967 Abortion Act’, p. 32.
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minds as necessary hoops through which they had to jump’.108 There
has been a clear shift away from an acceptance of paternalism towards
an understanding of the need to accept and respect patient autonomy.109
This implies that game-playing and performance may have become less
pivotal over time, and that the medical interview has become less of an
unknown and unpredictable encounter for women. However, women’s
testimonies of abortion experiences retain important continuities across
the period, and an ongoing variability of experiences is clearly evident. It
is still demonstrably more difficult for some women to obtain an abortion
than others; even if ideas of sympathetic categories have changed over time
they have not disappeared. It is important to recognize ongoing barriers
for women in accessing terminations through their doctor, which recent
studies have made clear.110 This represents an important reminder of the
difficulties and stigma that women in Britain still might face under the
conditions of a ﬁfty-year-old Act.
108 Allen, Counselling Services, pp. 172–5.
109 Sheldon et al., ‘Abortion Act’.
110 A.R. A. Aiken, K. A. Guthrie,M. Schellekens, J. Trussell andR.Gomperts, ‘Barriers to accessing
abortion services and perspectives on using mifepristone and misoprostol at home in Great Britain’,
Contraception Journal, 97/2 (2018), pp. 177–83.
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